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 Michael Lucht (and his company, MRL Development 
I, LLC), purchased treated lumber for a deck on his vacation 
home in the Virgin Islands. The lumber allegedly decayed 
prematurely. After replacing rotten deck boards, Lucht 
brought suit against the retailer, wholesaler, and treatment 
company of the lumber.  
 Lucht purchased the lumber between 2002 and 2006. 
He began replacing deck boards in 2010, but he claims he did 
not discover the severity of the problem until the fall of 2011. 
Lucht and MRL filed suit in February 2013, alleging the 
following claims against the appellees: (1) a Uniform 
Commercial Code contract claim; (2) a common law contract 
claim; (3) a breach of warranty claim; (4) a negligence claim; 
(5) a strict liability claim; and (6) a deceptive trade practices 
claim under the Virgin Islands Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
(“DTPA”). The appellees are the retailer, Whitecap 
Investment Corporation, d/b/a Paradise Lumber (“Paradise”); 
the wholesaler, Putnam Lumber & Export Company and 
Putnam Family Properties, Inc. (“Putnam”); and the treatment 
company, Great Southern Wood Preserving, Inc. (“Great 
Southern”).  
 The District Court granted summary judgment against 
Lucht and MRL on the basis that all claims were time-barred. 
We agree, except that we will review the tort claims under the 
gist of the action doctrine, and will affirm on that basis. 
I. 
A. 
 The underlying product at the heart of this dispute, the 
lumber, was pressure treated by Great Southern. It offers 
various services, one of which is called Yellawood and one 
designated as “Treatment Services Only” (“TSO”). Under the 
TSO process, Great Southern does not purchase the lumber 
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itself, but rather treats lumber purchased by the customer to 
the customer’s requested treatment level. Great Southern does 
not test the lumber for retention or penetration levels when it 
fills a TSO lumber order. Yellawood is lumber that has been 
purchased and pressure treated by Great Southern. It is tested 
for retention and penetration levels and includes a warranty.  
 Great Southern supplied primarily TSO lumber to 
Putnam on a wholesale basis, order-by-order. The TSO 
lumber has a green tag. The appellees assert that the 
appellants purchased TSO lumber rather than Yellawood 
lumber, and Lucht stated on the record that he believes the 
tags on the lumber were green.  
 The lumber that the appellants purchased was for a 
home that MRL acquired in the Virgin Islands to serve as a 
vacation home for Lucht and a rental property for MRL. 
Lucht began renovating the home, a project which extended 
from 2002 to December 2006. As part of this project, Lucht 
added a deck which he constructed with pressure-treated 
lumber that was purchased from Paradise.  
 After finishing the deck, at the latest in December 
2006, Lucht visited the home every three months. Lucht 
alleges that, starting in 2010, each time he visited the home he 
had to replace a few boards in the deck. A year after he 
started replacing the boards, in the fall of 2011, he asserts that 
he had a meeting with a carpenter friend who informed Lucht 
that he had been replacing bad lumber all over the island. 
Lucht contends that he then realized that the problem with his 
deck was widespread and would likely continue.  
 
B. 
 The appellants filed their complaint in this action in 
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the Virgin Islands Superior Court in February 2013. They 
amended their complaint on March 7, 2013. The appellees 
thereafter removed the case to the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands based on diversity jurisdiction. In addition, the 
appellees asserted various cross-claims against each other. 
 Putnam filed the first dispositive motion (pertinent to 
this appeal), requesting that the District Court dismiss the 
appellants’ contract, breach of warranty, and DTPA claims. 
The District Court granted this motion.1 Thereafter, Great 
Southern and Putnam filed motions for summary judgment, 
and Paradise joined in each motion. The appellees also filed 
motions for summary judgment on the cross-claims. The 
District Court granted the appellees’ motions for summary 
judgment against appellants, dismissed the motions regarding 
the cross-claims as moot, and entered judgment in favor of 
the appellees.  
 The District Court found that the appellants’ contract 
claims were time-barred because (1) they were subject to the 
U.C.C.’s four-year statute of limitations; (2) the discovery 
rule is inapplicable under the U.C.C.; and (3) the statute of 
limitations had thus expired in December 2010 prior to the 
filing of the complaint. Similarly, the District Court found the 
warranty claim was time-barred. As to the negligence and 
strict liability claims, the District Court found that although 
the applicable two-year statute of limitations is subject to the 
discovery rule, Lucht discovered the rotting lumber in 2010, 
his investigation of the issue was insufficient, and he was 
therefore ineligible for tolling of the limitations period. 
Finally, the District Court found that the DTPA claims were 
subject to the two-year statute of limitations in the version of 
the DTPA in place at the time of filing the complaint, rather 
                                              
1 The appellants have not appealed that decision. 
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than under the amended statute  (which provided a six-year 
statute of limitations) because the claims accrued at or before 
the time of purchase in 2006. Accordingly, the District Court 
held that the DTPA claims were time-barred. 
 The appellants timely appealed the District Court’s 
dismissal. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a) and 48 U.S.C. §§ 1612(a) and 1613 because the 
parties meet the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. This 
Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 The 
appellants appealed only the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment. We apply “a plenary standard in 
reviewing orders entered on motions for summary judgment, 
applying the same standard as the District Court.” Blunt v. 
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). 
We must therefore consider “whether there are any genuine 
issues of material fact such that a reasonable jury could return 
a verdict for the [appellants].” Banks v. Int’l Rental & 
                                              
 2Although we recently determined that our jurisdiction 
over cases arising from the Virgin Islands District Court has 
been altered by the 1984 Revised Organic Act and the 1990 
amendment by the Virgin Islands legislature to 4 V.I. Code § 
76(a), we also indicated that there was “no reason not to 
incorporate the federalism principles applicable throughout 
the circuit into our relationship with the Virgin Islands 
courts” and to act otherwise would “subvert[] the dual aims of 
Erie [R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)].” Edwards v. 
HOVENSA, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 360–61 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, 
jurisdiction is proper in this action as the parties are diverse. 
Id.   
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Leasing Corp., 680 F.3d 296, 297 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012). In doing 
so, we must apply the substantive laws of the Virgin Islands, 
including its statutes of limitations. HOVENSA, 497 F.3d at 
360 (“The fact that the District Court of the Virgin Islands is 
an Article IV court rather than an Article III court does not 
preclude the application of Erie.”). 
 The appellees have advanced some arguments that 
were not relied upon by the District Court in granting 
summary judgment. The appellants argue that this Court 
should not consider any grounds other than those considered 
by the District Court. New Castle Cty. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. 
Co. of Pittsburgh, 174 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A]s a 
general rule, we will consider only issues passed upon by the 
court below.”). However, “[i]nasmuch as our review is 
plenary, ‘we may affirm the District Court on any grounds 
supported by the record,’ even if the court did not rely on 
those grounds.” Blunt, 767 F.3d at 265 (quoting Nicini v. 
Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000)). Accordingly, this 
Court may consider the other arguments that have been 
advanced by the appellees. 
III. 
 We will undertake a review of the appellants’ claims in 
the order they appear in the appellants’ amended complaint, 
starting with the breach of contract and warranty claims, 
moving next to the tort claims, and ending with the DTPA 
claims.  
A. 
 The appellants asserted two breach of contract 
claims—one against Putnam and one against Paradise—
pursuant to the U.C.C. and common law; and a breach of 
warranty claim against all of the appellees. Common law 
contract and warranty claims have a six-year statute of 
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limitations under the Virgin Islands Code. V.I. Code tit. 5, § 
31(3)(A). The parties agree that the discovery rule3 is 
applicable to common law claims. The parties disagree, 
however, about whether the U.C.C. supplants the common 
law claims in this action and precludes the application of the 
discovery rule, which would in turn bar the appellants’ 
claims. V.I. Code tit. 11A, § 2-725. 
 In order to apply the correct statute of limitations, we 
must first determine whether the appellants’ common law 
claims may stand or are supplanted by the U.C.C. This will 
allow us to then determine the applicability of the discovery 
rule and apply the correct statute of limitations.  
1. 
 In assessing whether the U.C.C. displaces a common 
law claim, this Court begins with two basic principles. First, 
the U.C.C. “must be liberally construed and applied to 
promote its underlying purposes and policies.” V.I. Code tit. 
11A, § 1-103(a); N.J. Bank, N.A. v. Bradford Sec. Operations, 
Inc., 690 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 1982). Second, “[u]nless 
displaced by the particular provisions of [the U.C.C.], the 
principles of law and equity . . . supplement its provisions.” 
V.I. Code tit. 11, § 1-103(b). Thus, the U.C.C. displaces the 
common law only “insofar as reliance on the common law 
would thwart the purposes of the Code.” N.J. Bank, 690 F.2d 
at 346. Where the U.C.C. supplants common law contract 
claims, the common law action will be barred. Id. 
                                              
 3We have, at various times, described the discovery 
rule as postponing the accrual date of a cause of action or, 
more precisely, as tolling the running of the limitations period 
once the action has accrued. See G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. 
Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 613 n.10 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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 We must decide whether the Virgin Islands U.C.C. 
supplants the appellants’ common law claims. The Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue. Where 
this occurs, we are “required to predict how the Supreme 
Court of the Virgin Islands would decide an issue of 
territorial law, and should seek guidance from Superior Court 
decisions in undertaking this endeavor.” HOVENSA, 497 F.3d 
at 361 n.3. The Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, 
however, “is not the highest court of the Territory [or] even 
an intermediate appellate court, but rather a trial court.” Id. at 
361. Accordingly, we are not bound by Superior Court 
decisions. Id.; see also Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 
Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (“[D]ecrees of 
lower state courts should be attributed some weight [but] the 
decision is not controlling where the highest court of the State 
has not spoken on the point.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 The parties have cited two Territorial Court decisions 
for their separate positions regarding the applicability of the 
U.C.C.’s statute of limitations. The Superior Court has 
subsumed the role of the Territorial Court and we will review 
those decisions as if they were decided by the Superior Court. 
 The Virgin Islands Territorial Court in White v. S&E 
Bakery, Inc., 26 V.I. 87 (Terr. Ct. 1991), found that the 
plaintiff in that action could go forward with claims under 
both the U.C.C. and the common law statutes of limitation. 
White, 26 V.I. at 90. However, White has never been cited by 
any other Virgin Islands court, and the opinion did not 
address the purview of the U.C.C. Additionally, the plaintiff 
in White had filed his action within the four-year statute of 
limitations that is provided by the U.C.C., and thus the 
finding that the claim qualified under both statute of 
limitations was unnecessary. Id.  
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 Six years earlier in Fombrun v. Controlled Concrete 
Prods., Inc., 21 V.I. 578 (Terr. Ct. 1985), the Territorial Court 
addressed the purview of the U.C.C. and found that a contract 
for the sale of goods was supplanted by the U.C.C. Id. at 581–
82. Although earlier, Fombrun provides a clearer analysis and 
the White court failed to cite it or discuss the prior holding in 
Fombrun.  
 Despite Fombrun’s persuasive qualities, these cases do 
not provide a clear picture of what the current law is on this 
issue as we would be forced to pick between two 
contradictory holdings—one of which failed to recognize that 
it was creating such a division. Thus, given that the Territorial 
Court decisions are not controlling on this Court because the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court has not spoken on the subject, 
Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465, and no other Virgin Islands 
courts have cited either case (other than the District Court in 
citing Fombrun), we will have to look elsewhere to make our 
prediction.    
 Consequently, we will analyze the application of the 
U.C.C. by applying a plain meaning interpretation of whether 
lumber qualifies as a “good” to determine whether the 
appellants’ common law contract and warranty claims should 
be supplanted by the U.C.C. See In re Am. Home Mortg. 
Holdings, Inc., 637 F.3d 246, 254–55 (3d Cir. 2011). 
“Goods” are “all things (including specially manufactured 
goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the 
contract for sale.” V.I. Code tit. 11A, § 2-105(1). The 
contracts at issue in this case are clearly governed by the 
U.C.C. The appellants allege that they had oral contracts, 
memorialized by invoices, with Putnam and Paradise, for the 
purchase of lumber. Lumber is a thing that is movable at the 
time of identification to the alleged contract for sale. Under a 
plain reading of the definition of “goods,” lumber is included 
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and the appellants’ claims fall within the purview of the 
U.C.C.4  
 This conclusion is bolstered by the purpose of the 
U.C.C. “[t]o introduce a uniform statute of limitations for 
sales contracts, thus eliminating jurisdictional variations and 
providing needed relief for concerns doing business on a 
nationwide scale.” V.I. Code tit. 11A, § 2-725 cmt. As such, 
failure to apply the U.C.C. in this situation would thwart the 
U.C.C.’s purpose to provide uniform limitations periods for 
claims involving contracts for the sale of goods, including 
lumber. 
2. 
 Because the U.C.C. applies, we will now address the 
appellants’ argument that the discovery rule applies to the 
U.C.C. 
 The Virgin Islands Code provides a six-year statute of 
limitations for actions involving a contract “except when, in 
special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute.” 
V.I. Code tit. 5, § 31. The Virgin Islands U.C.C., on the other 
hand, provides that an action for breach of contract is subject 
                                              
4 The District Court similarly concluded that the 
U.C.C. statute of limitations governed the claims against all 
appellees for breach of warranty. The appellants do not argue 
on appeal that, because the bulk of the lumber shipped from 
Great Southern to Putnam was TSO lumber, the alleged 
contracts at issue were for services and not goods; instead, 
they argue that U.C.C. and common law contract claims may 
be asserted simultaneously. The argument that these contracts 
were for services is therefore waived, and we need not 
address it. See, e.g., In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
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to a four-year statute of limitations. V.I. Code tit. 11A, § 2-
725(1). This statute of limitations is restricted by the 
subsection that follows, subsection two, which provides that 
“[a] cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, 
regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the 
breach. V.I. Code tit. 11A, § 2-725(2) (hereinafter referred to 
as “subsection two”). Subsection four of that provision, 
however, states that “[t]his section does not alter the law on 
tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes 
of actions which have accrued before this title becomes 
effective.” V.I. Code tit. 11A, § 2-275(4) (hereinafter referred 
to as “subsection four”).  
 The appellants argue that, despite subsection two’s 
instruction that the aggrieved party’s knowledge is not to be 
considered, subsection four’s pronouncement allows for the 
application of the discovery rule to U.C.C. claims. The 
appellees argue, and the District Court found, that subsection 
two prohibits the application of the discovery rule and 
subsection four refers to equitable tolling.   
 One Virgin Islands court has found that the discovery 
rule does not apply to the U.C.C. Fombrun, 21 V.I. at 582–
83. This case is a Territorial Court case, however, and the 
court did not undergo a review of subsection two in 
conjunction with subsection four. The Fombrun court did not 
undertake a review of what comprises “the law on tolling.” 
This Court must therefore interpret the statute to determine 
whether the discovery rule is applicable because neither the 
Virgin Islands legislature nor the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court has provided the parameters for what constitutes “the 
law on tolling.”  
 When interpreting a statute, this Court must give effect 
to the legislature’s intent. In re Am. Home Mortg., 637 F.3d at 
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254. This determination begins with the statute and if the text 
is plain, this Court need not inquire further. Id. at 255. If the 
legislature’s intent is made plain, “it is unnecessary for us to 
refer to other canons of statutory construction, and indeed we 
should not do so.” Id. at 254–55. Moreover, just because 
party opponents may “proffer different interpretations of the 
statutory language does not make the language ambiguous. It 
just makes the court’s role difficult in deciding which 
interpretation is persuasive.” Id. at 256. 
 Given the parties’ differing interpretations, this Court 
must determine which interpretation of the two subsections is 
correct. We have indicated that both the discovery rule and 
equitable tolling require diligence on the part of the plaintiff 
with the potential consequence of losing the benefit of either 
doctrine.5  The two doctrines differ, however, as to their 
purposes in application. G.L., 802 F.3d at 613 n.10, 614 n.12 
(citing William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 646 F.3d 138, 
150 (3d Cir. 2011); Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1390). 
 The discovery rule focuses on the plaintiff’s 
knowledge of injury, whereas equitable tolling focuses on the 
time to bring an action despite discovery of the injury. Id. at 
614 n.2. Given the difference between the two doctrines, the 
two § 2-725 subsections each stand alone, subsection two 
referring to the discovery rule and subsection four referring to 
equitable estoppel. Such a reading is consistent with this 
                                              
5 Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 
F.3d 1380, 1390 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Keystone Ins. Co. v. 
Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1127 (3d. Cir. 1988), abrogated on 
other grounds by Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 
(1997) (for the discovery rule); Reeb v. Econ. Opportunity 
Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 930 (5th Cir. 1975) (for equitable 
tolling)). 
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Court’s preference to construe a statute in a way that gives 
meaning to all provisions. Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 
143 (3d Cir. 2009) (“It is a well known canon of statutory 
construction that courts should construe statutory language to 
avoid interpretations that would render any phrase 
superfluous.”). 
  Subsection two encompasses the discovery rule 
because it relies on the plaintiff’s knowledge or imputed 
knowledge, coinciding with subsection two’s prohibition on 
considering the “aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the 
breach.” V.I. Code tit. 11A, § 2-725(2). This leaves 
subsection four, which refers to “tolling”, to be applied where 
equitable tolling is at issue. In contrast, reading the two 
subsections together as the appellants request would 
essentially read subsection two out of the statute, rendering 
the “phrase superfluous.” See Kendall, 572 F.3d at 143; see 
also Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 456–57 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (finding that identical language of a statute was clear 
and weighed against the application of the discovery rule). 
Such a result is consistent with our prior holdings.  
 We have previously found the discovery rule 
inapplicable to conversion actions under Pennsylvania’s 
U.C.C. Menichini v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224, 1229–31 (3d Cir. 
1993). In making that finding, our focus centered on the 
U.C.C.’s “objectives of negotiability, finality, and uniformity 
in commercial transactions.” Id. at 1230. Similar objectives 
are found in the Virgin Islands U.C.C.’s official comment 
regarding the statute of limitations:  
[the purpose of this section is] [t]o introduce a 
uniform statute of limitations for sales 
contracts, thus eliminating jurisdictional 
variations and providing needed relief for 
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concerns doing business on a nationwide scale 
whose contracts have heretofore been governed 
by several different periods of limitation 
depending upon the state in which the 
transaction occurred.  
 
V.I. Code tit. 11A, § 2-725 cmt. In accordance with this 
focus, we find that the discovery rule does not apply to 
contract claims covered by the Virgin Islands U.C.C. 
3. 
 Under the applicable four-year statute of limitations, 
the appellants’ contract claims are time-barred. A claim for 
breach of contract accrues when the breach occurs. This 
precludes the consideration of the plaintiff’s knowledge of the 
breach. Id. § 2-725(1). The appellants’ contract claim is 
clearly time-barred as the breach of the contract occurred in 
December 2006, at the latest, when the last of the lumber was 
purchased from Paradise. As the appellants did not file this 
action until February 2013, the two contract claims fall 
outside of the four-year limitations period.  
 The breach of warranty claims are also time-barred. 
Where the underlying contract falls within the U.C.C., the 
warranty claim will also be subject to the U.C.C.’s 
application. Id. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (referencing 
warranties in relation to the contract for the sale of goods to 
which they attach). A breach of warranty claim starts to 
accrue “when tender of delivery is made, except that where a 
warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the 
goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of 
such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach 
is or should have been discovered.” Id.; § 2-725. 
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 The final tender of delivery of the lumber was made in 
December 2006, when the last lumber was bought for the 
renovation of the home. Thus, the warranty claim is time-
barred if there is no explicit warranty extending to future 
performance of the lumber.  
 The term “explicit” under the U.C.C. is defined as “not 
implied merely or conveyed by implication; distinctly stated; 
plain in language; clear; not ambiguous; express; 
unequivocal” or “that which is so clearly or distinctly set 
forth that there is no doubt as to its meaning.” Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp. v Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 
280, 291 n.25 (3d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Moreover, the defendant’s knowledge of the 
plaintiff’s expectations or the possible reliance by the plaintiff 
on the defendant’s expertise does not transform 
“representations regarding the performance of existing 
products . . . into explicit warranties of future performance.” 
Id. 
 No reasonable jury could find, based on Lucht’s 
statements during his deposition, that an explicit warranty of 
future performance was made. Lucht stated that he: (1) never 
had contact with or heard of Putnam or Great Southern prior 
to this suit, (2) was not told by any Paradise employee that the 
lumber was treated a certain way or that it would last for a 
certain amount of time, (3) did not request a specific type of 
treatment of the lumber and purportedly relied on the 
representation that the lumber was pressure treated, (4) could 
not recall exactly what the tags on the end of the individual 
pieces of lumber stated but remembered that the tags were 
green, and (5) did not receive a warranty or any other 
representations from Putnam. Great Southern also provided 
evidence that the Yellawood tags, which provide a limited 
warranty, are not green and that the majority of the lumber 
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sold to Putnam is TSO lumber, which has no warranty and 
has green tags. Additionally, the invoices from Paradise to 
Lucht do not state that Lucht received a warranty.  
 Lucht also stated in his deposition that he had no 
knowledge of whether his contractor informed Paradise that 
he needed a certain type of treated lumber or that he indicated 
at any time what type of lumber he needed when he picked up 
orders from Paradise. Lucht did state that he relied on 
Paradise to furnish the correct lumber, but he provided no 
evidence that suggests that his reliance was justified or that 
Paradise had reason to know of such reliance. Lucht indicated 
that he relied only on his architect to specify, and his 
contractor to pick, the correct type of lumber.  
 The appellees made no warranties. Given the record, 
there is no genuine issue of material fact that Lucht was given 
any type of explicit warranty of future performance.  
 The only other available avenue of recovery for the 
appellants would be equitable tolling under subsection four of 
the U.C.C.’s statute of limitations provision. The appellants, 
however, have failed to assert this argument in this appeal. 
Rather, the appellants focus on the discovery rule in their 
briefs and the only parties to address such an argument, 
interestingly, are the appellees. Accordingly, this Court will 
not consider this argument as it has been waived by the 
appellants. In re Surrick, 338 F.3d at 237 (“Failure to identify 
or argue [an] issue in [the] opening brief constitutes waiver of 
[an] argument on appeal.”). 
 
B. 
Three issues arose in the District Court regarding the 
appellants’ tort claims, whether the claims were: (1) 
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precluded by the gist of the action doctrine, (2) timely filed, 
or (3) precluded by the economic loss doctrine. Because the 
appellants’ tort claims are barred by the gist of the action 
doctrine, we will not undertake a review of the other two 
issues. 
This Court has found that the gist of the action 
doctrine applies in Virgin Islands actions. Addie v. Kjaer, 737 
F.3d 854, 868–69 (3d Cir. 2013). “[T]he ‘gist of the action 
doctrine’ bars plaintiffs from bringing a tort claim that merely 
replicates a claim for breach of an underlying contract.” 
Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 680 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2002) (applying Pennsylvania law). “[W]hile the existence of 
a contractual relationship between two parties does not 
prevent one party from bringing a tort claim against another, 
the gist of the action doctrine precludes tort suits for the mere 
breach of contractual duties”; the plaintiff must instead point 
to “independent events giving rise to the tort.” Addie, 737 
F.3d at 865–66. “[T]he important difference between contract 
and tort actions is that the latter lie from the breach of duties 
imposed as a matter of social policy while the former lie for 
the breach of duties imposed by mutual consensus.” Bohler–
Uddeholm Am., Inc. v Ellwood Grp. Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 103 
(3d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
A claim arises from contract, rather than social policy, 
when it is one: 
(1) arising solely from a contract between the 
parties; (2) where the duties allegedly breached 
were created and grounded in the contract itself; 
(3) where liability stems from a contract; or (4) 
where the tort claim essentially duplicates a 
breach of contract claim or the success of which 
is wholly dependent on the terms of a contract.  
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Id. at 866 (quoting eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advertising, 
Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)).  
The appellants assert that their tort claims are 
supported by the public policy that sellers have a duty not to 
distribute defective and unreasonably dangerous construction 
products. This public policy argument, however, runs counter 
to the gist of the action doctrine. The appellants’ negligence 
and strict liability claims and alleged injuries arise solely 
from the allegation that the purchased lumber was not 
appropriately treated for use as building material in the Virgin 
Islands: a breach of a duty established, if at all, from a 
contract or warranty rather than a tort. The appellants have 
not asserted any other injury to themselves or to renters of the 
home. The appellants’ tort claims “essentially duplicate [the] 
breach of contract claim[s].” Jefferson v. Bay Isles Assoc., 
L.L.L.P., Civil No. ST-09-CV-186, 2011 WL 3853332, 59 
V.I. 31 at *10 (Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2011) (quoting eToll, 811 
A.2d at 19). As a result, the appellants’ tort claims are barred 
by the gist of the action doctrine. 
C. 
 The appellants’ DTPA claim against Putnam was 
previously dismissed and was not appealed. The only DTPA 
claims pending on appeal are those against Great Southern 
and Paradise. Those claims are time-barred. 
 The appellants assert that the DTPA’s six-year statute 
of limitations, which went into effect in October 2013, rather 
than the two-year statute of limitations that was in place at the 
time their complaint was filed in February 2013, applies. The 
appellants’ assertion is incorrect. 
 The appellants argue that the six-year statute of 
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limitations applies because the Virgin Islands legislature 
voiced social policy concerns in the amendment’s bill. The 
text of the bill indicates that the legislature was concerned 
that other states “provide greater protection to their citizens 
and businesses while the laws of the Virgin Islands fail to 
give the same strong protections and remedies.” Bill No. 30-
0123, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (V.I. 2013). 
 There is a presumption against applying legislation 
that would revive otherwise untimely claims. This 
presumption is based on the principle “that the legal effect of 
conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that 
existed when the conduct took place.” Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, 
J., concurring); see also Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 
1486 (2012); In re Exxon Mobil Corp. Sec. Litig., 500 F.3d 
189, 196 (3d Cir. 2007), as amended (Nov. 20, 2007). In 
applying this presumption, we are guided by: 
a two-part test for determining whether a 
particular statute applies retroactively. At the 
first stage, a court must determine if Congress 
has expressly prescribed the statute’s intended 
reach. If Congress has done so, the inquiry ends 
. . . If the statute is ambiguous or contains no 
express command, a court must examine 
whether the statute would have an adverse 
effect if it were held to be retroactive; that is to 
say, “whether it would . . . increase a party’s 
liability for past conduct . . . .” 
 
Lieberman v. Cambridge Partners, LLC, 432 F.3d 482, 488–
89 (citation omitted) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 
511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994)). 
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 The language used by the Virgin Islands legislature 
and cited by the appellants does not meet the first step of the 
Lieberman test. A social policy concern that consumers be 
protected does not meet the specificity requirement that a 
legislature enunciate an express and unambiguous intent that 
expired claims should be revived. Thus, the appellants’ 
DTPA claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations 
unless the second Lieberman step is met.  
 The DTPA statute of limitations began “running from 
the date the violation of the statute occurred, not the date the 
violation was discovered.” Island Insteel Sys., Inc. v. Waters, 
296 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2002). Each DTPA claim that the 
appellants have asserted and the applicable DTPA 
enumerated prohibited activities—misrepresentation of the 
quality or standard of the goods, or misrepresentation of a 
material fact or failing to state a material fact “if such use 
deceives or tends to deceive”—involve pre-sale conduct. See 
V.I. Code tit. 12A, § 102; App. at 122–23 (appellants’ DTPA 
claims only allege pre-sale conduct). Any DTPA violation 
therefore occurred at the latest in December 2006 when the 
last of the allegedly defective lumber was purchased. 
 Consequently, retroactively applying the six-year 
statute of limitations period would impermissibly increase the 
appellees’ liability. See Lieberman, 432 F.3d at 492 
(explaining that “resurrection of previously time-barred 
claims ‘increases a party’s liability’ by abolishing complete 
defense to a suit” (quoting In re Enter. Mrtg. Acceptance Co., 
LLC Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d 401, 409-10 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
Because the Lieberman test is not met, the appellants had to 
file by December 2008 under the two-year statute of 
limitations. They failed to do so and their DTPA claims are 
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time-barred.6  
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
order of the District Court. 
                                              
6 Moreover, even if we were to apply the six-year 
statute of limitations, which we have found does not apply, 
the appellants’ DTPA claims are time-barred.  
